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ABSTRACT
ISPs and other email service providers are increasingly offering
their customers the ability to store, on the service providers'
computers, very large quantities of information. This free or low
cost storage offers Internet users the convenience of access to their
email and attached documents and photographs from any Internet-
connected computer in the world. However, it also has unintended
consequences for personal privacy, especially because privacy
laws were written when consumer use of such remote storage was
rare.
For this paper, we reviewed existing legislation governing
stored electronic communications and data, and we examined the
storage practices and disclosure policies of some of the most well-
known ISPs.
We found that online service providers address many privacy
issues associated with storage through their terms of service and
privacy policies. For the most part, leading service providers
promise consumers relatively strong protections and adhere to
them. However, it is sometimes hard to determine what a specific
provider's policy is, especially with respect to deletion of mail
from inactive accounts or deletion of older mail from active
accounts. When it comes to government access, the best privacy
policy in the world yields to a warrant or perhaps even a mere
subpoena, often without notice to the customer that her personal
documents are being disclosed. Since ISPs retain data for varying
lengths of time, and do not always delete email immediately upon
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request, customers may not even be aware of whether their email is
still stored, and thus susceptible to disclosure.
Most importantly, we found that the major law setting rules
for government access to email, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), no longer offers adequate privacy
protections, given changes in the way people today use their email
accounts and remote storage. We conclude that, given the rapid
onset of the storage revolution, consumer expectations are likely
out ,of line with the realities of online privacy protection. In the
new environment of massive storage capacity, reform is needed on
both the government side and the industry side. The best approach
to dealing with the policy issues posed by increased online storage
is a mix of consumer education, clear ISP policies, and updates to
ECPA and other pertinent privacy laws.
INTRODUCTION
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-based providers of
email are offering consumers free email with expansive storage and
searching capability. Additional services include Web-posting and
online calendars that enable information sharing with friends and
colleagues. These services provide storage space that was
unimaginable twenty years ago.
While these services offer consumers flexibility and mobile access,
they raise a range of concerns because they reflect a sea of change
from the concepts on which the legal framework for electronic
communications was originally based. These concerns include:
the diminishing relevance of traditional constitutional search
and seizure rules, combined with the limitations of statutory
privacy protections, as information moves out of the home,
off personal computer hard drives, and onto remote servers;
some lack of transparency and clarity regarding ISP
practices in storing or deleting subscriber emails;
the legal uncertainty surrounding what ISPs can do with the
personal information and communications of their
customers; and
the difficulty next of kin may encounter in retrieving
important information held in a deceased user's account.
(Vol. 1:2-3
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This paper will offer recommendations for legal reforms and improved
best practices.
THE STORAGE REVOLUTION
As the Internet has moved into schools, homes, and offices, email
has become a primary means of communication, and the Web has
become an important means of storing and retrieving information.
While the telephone is still a more ubiquitous medium, email and other
internet communications are often cheaper and are used more often
than the telephone or traditional mail for certain kinds of transactions.
Unlike telephone calls, emails can be easily saved for future reference.
Moreover, unlike telephone calls and traditional mail, copies of email
can be stored with the service provider. Until recently, this potential
of third party storage was largely unrealized; the primary means of
storing older email was on one's desktop computer after download.
Due in part to cost considerations, providers of free services used to
offer their customers the ability to store only a relatively small amount
of email on the service provider's computer.
However, innovations in storage technology have enabled the
retention of much larger amounts of data at lower costs. As the
National Institute for Standards and Technology has pointed out, the
nation's digital storage industry - makers of the tapes, disks, and other
gear that have become the archives and the retrieval tools of the
information age - has been doubling storage capacity about every 18
months.2 The first hard disk drive produced by IBM in 1956 had a
capacity of 5 megabytes. In 1998, the IBM Deskstar hard drive had a
25-gigabyte capacity, which is approximately 5000 times the capacity
of the first drive. One year later, IBM announced the 73-gigabyte hard
drive.3 According to one industry estimate, 1 gigabyte worth of
magnetic disk storage capacity cost $8.37 in 2000 and is expected to
cost $0.42 by 2005 and less than a penny by 2013. 4
2 Advanced Technology Forum, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Data
Storage, available at http://www.atp.nist.gov/atp/focus/dds.htm (last accessed May 25, 2005).
3 Fortune City, Storage Devices, at http://www.fortunecity.com/marina/reach/435/storage.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
4 Steve Gilheany, The Decline of Magnetic Disk Storage Cost Over the Next 25 Years,
available at http://www.berghell.com/whitepapers/Storage%20Costs.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2005).
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In April 2004, Google started to beta-test its "Gmail" system,
which provides users with 1 gigabyte of storage space for free. This
represented 500 times the amount of the equivalent MSN/Hotmail
account at the time. 5 In response to the "Gmail" offering, Yahoo!
announced that it would increase free customer storage space to 100
megabytes and that paid customers would receive 2 gigabytes.
MSN/Hotmail followed, declaring that it would upgrade the storage
space of free accounts to 250 megabytes and paid accounts to 2
gigabytes. Then a year later, Google upped the ante, by providing 2
gigabytes for free to Gmail beta-testers.
This dramatic growth in storage capacity comes at a time when
more email is being read via webmail accounts. In the past,
particularly at the time when current email privacy laws were written,
email users accessed their email by downloading it onto their personal
computers. Now, email - including email that has been read but which
still has value to the user - often sits on a third party server accessible
via the Web.
In addition, various other consumer technology developments
drive the demand for greater storage space. For example, the
combination of digital cameras and higher bandwidth connections
encourages users not only to send photographs as email attachments
but also to store photos on personal Web spaces offered on the systems
of service providers. Online merchants encourage customers to create
online itineraries or profiles, storing historical records on service
providers' computers for easy access from any Internet-connected
computer. Confirmations of online airline ticket purchases come
through email, creating a record of the travel that may also reside with
the email service provider.
As one analyst for Jupiter Research stated, "[tihe key thing about
increasing storage is to make the e-mail service more of a core
resource in the user's computing life. If you can put 250 megabytes
worth the consumer will use it more often." 6 Further encouraging
increased usage, email providers are emphasizing complementary
services, such as searching capabilities, photo albums and file servers.
As Google asks its Gmail users, "Who needs to delete when you have
5 Hiawatha Bray, Google's Gmail Is Still a Rough Draft, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 2004,
available at http:llwww.boston.com/businessltechnology/articlesl2004/05/3 1/
googles.gmail is still ajrough.draft/ (last accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
6 Janis Mara, MSN Hotmail Upgrades E-Mail, Increases Storage, ClickZ News, June 24, 2004,
at http://www.clickz.coml/newslarticle.php/3372781 (last accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
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1000 MB of storage?!",7 With the changes presaged by Gmail, it is
clear that consumers will be storing more mail and attachments on
third party servers.
While the technology offers a welcome set of new services for
consumers, most users are not aware of the consequences that flow
from the decision to store their personal information and files
remotely. Unless the law catches up, loss of privacy may be a hidden
and unintended price of these new services. Under current law, a
consumer's personal communications and records in electronic storage
with an ISP or other service provider are afforded less privacy than
those same communications in transit, and less than if they were stored
on the consumer's own computer or printed out and put in a physical
file cabinet. Consumers are not aware of these legal distinctions and
have little or no idea what kind of access government agents have to
their stored data. Similarly, consumers probably do not know what
use ISPs can make of their stored email and files. For all these
reasons, it is likely that the rules controlling government and ISP
access to these personal records are inconsistent with consumers'
privacy expectations.
THE CURRENT RULES FOR GOVERNMENT ACCESS
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution shields
individuals from unreasonable government searches and seizures. The
Supreme Court has said that the Fourth Amendment protects "people,
not places."' Under the Court's analysis, whether a search violates the
Fourth Amendment turns on whether the individual has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." This is a two-part inquiry that asks first
whether the individual's conduct reflects "an actual [subjective]
expectation of privacy" and, if the answer is yes, whether that
expectation is "one that society [objectively] is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' 9 Under this analysis, the Supreme Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment protects not only a person's home or
apartment and his physical person, but also the content of his
telephone calls. While the Court has never explicitly ruled on email, it
7 This is the message that Gmail users receive when they look in their trash folder if nothing
has been deleted. In its entirety, the message reads: "No conversations in the trash. Who
needs to delete when you have 1000 MB of storage?!"
8 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
9 Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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has been assumed that the same Fourth Amendment protection would
apply to email in transit.
However, in a series of cases in the 1970s, the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to personal information
contained in records held by third parties. Once an individual
voluntarily discloses information to a business, the Court reasoned, the
individual no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
data and the government can access the record without raising any
constitutional privacy concerns.I°
Although these "business record" decisions predated the digital
revolution, they are still cited to support the proposition that
individuals have no constitutionally protected privacy interest in
personal information and records voluntarily disclosed to businesses.
Under this theory, everything from medical records at hospitals and
insurance companies, to copies of cancelled checks held by banks, to
records of who calls whom compiled by telephone companies, fall
outside the Constitution. Unless these records are protected by statute
(which some business records are), they can be freely disclosed by
service providers to the government and to others.
There are serious questions whether the business records
doctrine is still constitutionally sound, given the revealing
nature of the huge amounts of transactional data generated
by electronic systems today. Moreover, it has never been
clear whether the business records doctrine properly applies
to the content of stored communications. The business
records doctrine was developed when courts did not foresee
the ability of a communications service provider to store the
content of communications. Nor did courts anticipate the
role of the Internet in decentralizing data storage outside the
10 In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Court held that subpoenaing an
accountant for records provided by a client for the purposes of preparing a tax return raised
neither Fifth nor Fourth Amendment concerns. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976), the Court held that records of an individual's financial transactions held by his bank
were outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Lastly, in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979), the Court held that individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
phone numbers they dial, and therefore the installation of a technical device (a pen register)
that captured such numbers on the phone company's property did not constitute a search. See
generally, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. Rev.
1557 (2004); see generally James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age:
Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65
(1997).
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home or office. The doctrine does not take into account
case law that limits government access to items held by a
third party in physical storage, such as a storage locker.
When an individual stores personal property with a third
party, the owner of the property often retains a privacy
interest in the stored items, meaning that a warrant would be
required to search the storage space. Under that analogy,
transactional information regarding the terms of storage
might not be protected by the Fourth Amendment, but the
stored items themselves - in this case, the contents of stored
email - might be.1
It is time to reconsider the limits of the business records doctrine as
applied to Internet communications and stored documents, for the
doctrine has played an important role in shaping the privacy
protections currently applied to email and other records when they are
in storage with a service provider. 12
In 1986 Congress adopted the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA). ECPA set rules for real-time interception of electronic
communications, requiring a special warrant for access to email in
transit just as had been required for tapping voice communications;
restricted law enforcement access to transactional information in real-
time with the Pen Register/Trap and Trace statute; and adopted rules
on access to stored electronic communications and stored transactional
records held by service providers. 
1 3
The part of ECPA addressing stored communications, known as
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), set rules for the government to
obtain the content of stored emails, transactional information related to
emails such as the senders and recipients, and subscriber identifying
information about the users of email services. In many ways, ECPA
was a remarkable law, but some of the distinctions in the SCA that
made sense in 1986 no longer seem valid. The rules are complex,
drawing many fime distinctions about which users are probably
completely unaware and that no longer match patterns of Internet
,1 For a discussion of storage cases and more on the applicability of this concept to stored
communications, see Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1375, 1405-06 & nn.185-86 (2004).
12 This process of reexamination has begun. See id.; see Mulligan, supra note 10.
13 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986), available at http://nsi.org/Library/Commecpa.txt.
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usage. 14  Influenced in part by the business records doctrine (even
though, as noted above, it has never been clear that the doctrine should
apply to the content of stored communications), ECPA's standards for
government access to email messages vary depending on whether the
email is "in transit" or resting in storage on the server of the recipient's
ISP. If the email is in transit, it is entitled to the highest protection
under the wiretap law. 15 Stored email is entitled to less protection, and
the level of protection depends on how long it has been stored and
possibly on whether it has been "opened" or not. In general, email
stored with a service provider for 180 days or less is afforded full
Fourth Amendment protection (although not the higher protection of
the wiretap laws) and can be disclosed to the government only
pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of probable cause. 16 Email
stored on the server of an ISP or other service provider for more than
180 days can be disclosed pursuant to a court order or even a mere
subpoena at a much lower standard. 17 And the Department of Justice
maintains that even very recent email stored on the computer of a
service provider falls under the lower standard of protection as soon as
it is opened by the customer. 8  To date, the only federal appellate
court to consider this issue rejected the government's position, finding
that within the 180-day period opened and unopened messages enjoy
14 Mulligan, supra note 10; Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 1208 (2004).
15 Government must have a court order issued on probable cause to intercept email messages
in transit. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2002).
16 Governmental entities are required to use a warrant to access the contents of electronic
communications in "electronic storage" for 180 days or less. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
17 If electronic communications are older than 180 days, the government may compel
disclosure using a variety of less protective instruments, including a warrant executable
without notice to the subscriber or a subpoena with notice or delayed notice. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b).
18 The government's position is that if a message is opened but remains on an ISP's server, it
is no longer subject to search warrant requirements under the Stored Communications Act
because it is not in "electronic storage" (defined as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication," 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2002)), which is the
statutory test for full protection. Instead, the opened email is merely being held for storage
purposes and is therefore accessible under the lower standards of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2002).
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uniform privacy protections.1 9 Disclosures to government entities by
cable ISPs are governed by the same rules.
20
The SCA also draws a distinction between providers of "electronic
communication services," which give consumers the ability to send
and receive email, and "remote computing services," which store or
process their customer's data. Under ECPA, the content of records
held by remote computing services can be accessed by the government
with a mere subpoena. Many ISPs today are both electronic
communication services and remote computing services. The ECPA
drafters had in mind the 1980s model of email services: users would
download email off the service provider's computer and generally did
not leave their email in the hands of the service provider. Today,
many mail programs are accessed through World Wide Web
interfaces, so email is by default stored on Web servers of third parties.
As a result of these complex rules, the same email message will be
subject to many different rules during its life span. These rules likely
do not match the expectations of email users. Most users are not
aware, for example, that stored email loses some privacy protection
when it is more than 180 days old or that even a new email may be
entitled to less privacy protection as soon as it is opened.
A June 2004 decision by the federal appeals court in Boston
triggered a controversy that illustrated another way in which ECPA
does not match user expectations. The case, United States v.
Councilman,21 noted that an ISP could read and use for its own
business purposes (but not disclose to others) the emails of subscribers
held in storage on the service provider's computers. The court went
one step further and held that emails could be read by service
providers even when they were in the very brief temporary storage that
occurs as an email is being transmitted. Mainstream ISPs do not read
their customers' email - the small ISP at issue may have been unique -
but the case drew attention to an overlooked gap in the law and led to a
rare en banc rehearing of the case.22 Many in industry feel that, given
19 The Ninth Circuit found that the Stored Communications Act covers electronic messages
received and opened by a recipient and resting on the service provider's servers because they
were "stored... for purposes of backup protection." Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066,
1075 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2004) (No. 03-1565).
20 See 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(D) (2001), added by § 211 of U.S. Patriot Act in 2001.
21 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc granted, 385 F.3d
793 (1st Cir. 2004).
22 See CDT Policy Post 10.13, Email Privacy Protection Called into Question by Federal
Appeals Court Decision (July 30, 2004), at http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_10.13.shtml
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the practices of legitimate ISPs, the Councilman controversy is
overblown. ECPA's failure to prohibit ISPs from reading their
subscribers' email, however, is in contrast to the law governing
telephone companies, which does prohibit them from listening to
customer conversations except to ensure service quality, detect fraud,
or otherwise provide service. 
3
CIVIL SUBPOENAS
The use of civil subpoenas to obtain information from ISPs has
recently received greater media attention, in part due to the recording
industry's initiative to subpoena the ISP records of individuals who are
accused of sharing copyrighted music files. For years, however, civil
subpoenas have been served on ISPs in civil disputes such as divorce
or custody cases, employment litigation, defamation, and other cases
between private parties.
ECPA focuses on government surveillance concerns, and it offers
no clear guidance on access to records by private litigants. ECPA
generally prohibits disclosures of the contents of stored email to
24private parties, with certain exceptions. None of the exceptions
expressly authorizes disclosures to private parties pursuant to a civil
subpoena. On the other hand, ECPA provides that ISPs can disclose
any records pertaining to subscribers other than the content of
communications to private parties without the subscriber's permission
and without a subpoena.25 (It is important to note that, as a matter of
policy, many ISPs do not disclose subscriber information without a
subpoena. To the extent that this policy is stated in a privacy policy
or terms of service, it is legally binding.) In addition, there is no
requirement in ECPA that the service provider disclosing records or
(last accessed Apr. 23, 2005). CDT filed an amicus brief urging reversal (siding with the
Justice Department). The en banc review pertains only to the question of whether emails can
be read while in temporary storage incident to transmission. An en banc reversal will
probably leave untouched the rule that ISPs can read their customers' emails after they come
to rest in the recipient's inbox on the ISP's server. That rule, even though it seems
inconsistent with Congress' overall intent in ECPA, does seem to be statutorily based, so its
revision will require legislative action. The court's en banc decision is expected sometime in
2005.
23 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2002).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2003).
25 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (permitting disclosure of subscriber information (not including the
contents of communications) to "any person other than a governmental entity").
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email content to a private litigant, or the private litigant obtaining them
via suboena give any notice to the person whose information is being
sought. In contrast, the Cable Act, unlike ECPA, does expressly
address the question of private party access to the content of stored
email. If the ISP is covered by the Cable Act, that law requires parties
in civil suits to obtain a court order and requires the cable operator
(offering ISP service in this instance) to provide notice to the
subscriber.
27
The process surrounding civil subpoenas can be complicated. For
example, a lawsuit may be filed in New York, the service provider
upon whom the subpoena is served may be in Virginia, and the
individual whose information is sought may live in California. Even if
a subpoena is issued by a court in the same state as the user's ISP and
the user is notified of the subpoena, the notice may not direct him to
the court in which the lawsuit is being filed or provide information
about the claims being made. To respond, even an individual who
realizes that her information has been requested would probably need
to hire a lawyer in the state where the subpoena is served or the state
where it was issued, or both, in order to file a formal objection prior to
the information being released by the service provider.
DELETION FROM STORAGE
Even as service providers offer expanded storage capacity, many
have tightened their rules for how long they will store information in
unused accounts before terminating the account and deleting the email.
This is understandable from a business perspective, because providers
want to purge unused accounts in order to free up more space for those
actually using it. However, users may not read the fine print and may
be astonished to find that information left in an unused account has
been wiped out, particularly if it was deleted without specific warning.
26 Virginia has a law requiring notification of ISP customers of a civil subpoena prior to
disclosure. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A)(3) (2004), available at
http://leg 1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?000+cod+8.01-407.1 (last accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
A similar proposal was before the California legislature but was not adopted. See The Internet
Communications Protection Act, A.B. 1143, 2003 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_ 1101-1150/
ab_1143_bill_20040621_amended sen.html (last accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
27 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) (2001) (as amended by the Patriot Act to make it clear
that, when a cable company is acting as an ISP, it is covered by ECPA for purposes of
disclosures to government entities, but the Patriot Act did not change the rules for cable ISP
disclosures to private parties in civil litigation.).
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A second question concerning deletion is when the provider will
automatically delete older mail from a still active account. It is
appropriate that policies differ from provider to provider - certainly
Google's competitive offer of a service that never deletes email
expands consumer choice - but there is a question whether users are
adequately informed of other ISPs' policies.
A third issue is whether records "deleted" by the subscriber are
actually removed from all backup storage. Actual practice may not
match the ordinary user's expectation that if he cannot retrieve a
message himself, then it cannot be retrieved at all. Google's Gmail
privacy policy raises an interesting point about "deletion time."
Google notes that it cannot assure that all backups of information will
be deleted immediately when a user requests that information be
deleted. In speaking with Google representatives about this issue, they
say that they are actually following industry practices, but feel
compelled to advise users that it is impossible to promise that all
deletion requests will be immediately implemented throughout their
system. Google says that information that a user believes to have been
deleted could be still available when a subpoena is issued.28
NEXT OF KIN REQUESTS
Access can also be a concern for family members who want access
to the account of a relative who has died. Much of an individual's
personal business may have been conducted through email, and
surviving next of kin may want to gain prompt access to that
information. While service providers often would like to help
families, security and privacy concerns put the service providers in a
difficult situation; at the least, service providers want to be sure they
are dealing with the legitimate heirs or executors of a deceased
customer before releasing what may be sensitive and even valuable
information. 29 Given that email accounts are typically not shared with
others, they may contain communications that the deceased, if given
the option, would not choose to provide to relatives. As people store
more information with third parties, these dilemmas will continue to
28 While some ISPs claim to delete instantly, they are probably not overwriting the
information instantly, leaving it available for discovery by forensic experts. Google is careful
not to claim that information is instantly deleted if it could possibly be made available during
discovery.
29 Jeffrey Selingo, Whose Data Is It, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 2004, at G1.
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grow. 30 It is unclear whether the resolution of the issues lies solely in
privacy law or will be best dealt with in combination with property and
estates law.
STUDY OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES
During the summer of 2004, the Center for Democracy and
Technology conducted a study of industry practices in relation to data
storage and access. We examined the policies of seven of the largest
commercial email providers. We collected most of our information
from the providers' Web sites, including terms of service and privacy
policies. When we could not find information, we called the ISPs'
help lines. We shared a draft of the results with the chief privacy
officer or legal counsel for each of the service providers studied.
Our survey covered five issues:
(1) Deletion Without Subscriber Request - When is an
inactive account terminated and its contents deleted, and
when is email automatically deleted from an active account?
(2) Deletion upon Request - How long does it take to
remove mail from the provider's server after the user deletes
it from her screen?
(3) Next of Kin Access - What documentation is required
from relatives in order to provide access to next of kin
records?
(4) Civil Subpoenas - Do email service providers give notice
to a subscriber whose records are sought pursuant to a civil
subpoena?
3 0 The issue is complex. Stored email implicates the privacy not only of the account holder
but also of those who corresponded with the account holder. The issue was illustrated recently
when Yahoo! denied the father of a U.S. Marine killed in Iraq access to the son's Yahoo email
account. The company felt bound by its terms of service, in which the company promises not
to disclose private email communications of its users. Our research indicated that Yahoo's
policy is to never transfer email, but a news story indicated that Yahoo! Would disclose the
stored data if family members obtained a court document verifying their identity and
relationship with the deceased. Jim Hu, Yahoo Denies Family Access to Dead Marine's E-
mail, CNEr NEwS.coM, Dec. 21, 2004, at http://news.com.com
Yahoo+denies+family+access+to+dead+marines+e-mail/2100-1038_3-5500057.html (last
accessed Apr. 23, 2005).
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(5) Reading Customer Email - Do the privacy notice and
terms of service agreement explicitly state that the company
does not read its customers' emails for purposes other than
providing service, enforcing terms of service, or protecting
the rights of the ISP?
We studied the practices only of the larger email providers.
Smaller ISPs may not have set policies on these matters.
The following chart summarizes the results of our survey. It
turned out that even from the large ISPs, it was sometimes difficult to
track down the policies addressing our questions, which suggests that
companies need to be more conscious of these issues and need to
inform users in a clear manner. The information below is accurate to
the best of our ability. We regret any errors.
Automatic Deletion - Deletion Upon Next of Kin Civil Subpoenas - Stated Policy
When is an inactive Request - Access - What is Is notice given to Against
account terminated Number of days required to gain subscriber whose Reading
and when is email between date access to the email information is Subscriber
deleted from an deleted by of a deceased sought? When is Email**
active account? subscriber and relative? the information
date removed handed over? *
from server.
MSN/ Termination - 30 3 days Show death Notify subscriber Implies no
Hotmail days from date of last certificate and whose information
Free activity official proof that is being sought
you are next of kin
Automatic deletion - Release
Sent email 4 information after 2
automatically deleted weeks
every 30 days
MSN/ Termination - 3 days Provide credit card Notify subscriber Implies no
Hotmail General account is number that the whose information
Paid closed 30 days from account is is being sought.
date of missed registered under to
payment transfer account Release
information after 2
Automatic deletion - weeks
Junk email -)
automatically
removed every 7
days
Google Termination - 90 Unspecified Under review Notify member Unclear
Gmail3 ' days from last (eventually will (have not had any whose information
activity be deleted/ requests to date) is being sought.
overwritten)
Automatic deletion - Release
never information after
20 days
31 Gmail was in beta at the time this study was undertaken.
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Yahoo! Termination - Inbox Immediately Fax death Notify subscriber Implies no
Free mail -4 90 days from (within a few certificate to close whose information
last activity minutes) the account is being sought.
Automatic deletion - Information in the Release
Bulk folder mail 4 account is non- information after
default is to delete transferable 15 days
every 30 days,
however user can
change this to a
shorter period of time
Yahoo! Termination - Inbox Immediately Fax death Notify subscriber Implies no
Paid mail 4 6 months certificate to close whose information
from date of missed account is being sought
payment
Information in the Release
Automatic deletion - account is non- information after
Bulk folder mail 4 transferable 15 days (need to
default is every 30 confirm)
days, however user
can shorten time
period
AOL Termination - Read email- Show death Notify subscriber Explicitly
General account immediately certificate and promptly after states no
deleted after 4 official proof that subpoena is
months from last Deleted you are executor/ received.
payment email4 24 administrator of
hours estate. Release
Automatic deletion - information after 2
Unread (i.e., weeks
unopened) and sent
email 4 27 days
Read email 4 about
3 days, and the user
can extend this
preference for up to 7
days
Earthlink Termination Immediately Accepts a death Notify customers Unclear in
certificate or other after receiving written
legal documents civil request. policy but
proving public
authorization. Release statements
information after explicitly
minimum of 10 state no
days
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Termination - Email
in primary account
typically deleted
within 90 days of
account being
marked for
suspension and
deletion due to
termination of
service.
Comcast Provide valid
death certificate
and proof of
next of kin status.
Email removed
from mail
server within 24
hours of being
deleted by
subscriber;
subscriber can
immediately
remove email
from mail
server by
emptying
webmail
"trash." Note:
certain
configurable
POP3 email
clients may
permit
subscribers to
override these
rules.
Verizon Termination - Immediately Send death Notify subscriber Implies no
(.Net and Mailbox closed after certificate and promptly after
Domain 6 months of being provide general subpoena is
based "unused" account received.
email information
services) Automatic deletion - Release
Inbox -- 30 days information after 2
weeks
Spam Detector -- 7
days
* Assuming that it is a non-emergency situation.
** With exceptions for security purposes, etc.
Some providers are explicit about giving users notice and control over
deletion/storage practices. For example, Comcast permits users to set
their own email deletion timeframes for webmail folders. Copied
below is the table of choices provided to subscribers, with the default
settings checked. Other ISPs may also provide user-defined deletion
policies for their webmail services.
Do not provide
information in
response to a
standard civil
subpoena; require
court order. Upon
receipt of valid
court order,
promptly give
notice to
subscriber.
Current policy is
to give customer
14 days notice
prior to disclosing
requested
customer
information.
Explicitly
states no
[Vol. 1:2-3
SCHWARTZ, MULLIGAN & MONDAL
Email Deletion Policy
Manage your email storage by automatically scheduling your lcoming email for deletion
after time periods you specify by selecting the options below. For example, you may set
your unread email to be automatically deleted after 30, 45, 60, 90, 120 days or specify
"no delete". Click SAVE to set your choices or CANCEL to return to the pre-selected
default settings.
Note: Email messages filed in your personal folders will never be deleted by Comcast. To
see how to set up personal folders, please C LICK HERE f
FOLDER OPTIONS (DAYS SAVED)
1 3 7 30 45 60 90 120 NO DELETE
inbox (unread) C 0 C C. C
inbox (read) C C C
SentMail (' C C C
Screened Mail C f? 0 C
Trash C 7
Industry practices on retention and deletion vary, which is not a
problem and may actually offer consumers desirable choices, so long
as policies are clear. Policies range from defaults to user control.
Emails from terminated free accounts, which are deleted based on date
of last activity, generally seem to be deleted earlier than those in paid
accounts, which are removed based on date of missed payment. For
the most part, emails deleted by the customer are removed from the
provider's server quickly, between a few hours to 3 days after the user
has deleted them. Google's Gmail service does not specify a server
removal date, but that seems to be due to extra precision on the part of
the drafters of Google's privacy statement, recognizing that even when
mail has been deleted from the ISP's server it may still be available for
forensic discovery until it has been overwritten.
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There is also a variety of policies with respect to next of kin
requests. Most service providers require high levels of proof, such as
death certificates, in order to verify next of kin requests. It is
interesting to note that, even with documentation, Yahoo! does not
give relatives access to the contents of a deceased person's account.
It is also interesting to see consistency in the way major ISPs
handle civil subpoena requests. In non-emergency situations, every
ISP we surveyed gives its customers notice soon after receiving
subpoena requests, and then allows customers generally about two
weeks to challenge the order prior to releasing information. (We
assume that this practice applies to disclosure of both email content
and subscriber identifying information.) Under the Cable Act, cable
ISPs require a court order to disclose information to private parties and
must provide notice to the subscriber, giving the subscriber an
opportunity to object.
Most ISPs in our survey implied that they do not read their
customers' email. Policies were not always explicit. As the
Councilman case illustrated, there may be outliers among smaller
ISPs.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the dramatic changes in technology, especially the shift to
Web-based email and the offering of huge amounts of online storage,
changes are needed in several areas. In particular, protecting user
privacy calls for a mix of user education, industry policies to protect
stored electronic communications better, and revisions to ECPA and
other pertinent privacy laws.
Most of our suggested legal changes relate to government access.
Some distinctions in ECPA now seem outdated. It no longer makes
sense to provide different protections depending on how old an email
is, or based on the possible (but disputed) distinction between opened
versus unopened email. In 1986, when ECPA was adopted,
downloaded email was generally not saved on the service providers'
computers. Downloaded email, whether opened or unopened, usually
sat only on the user's computer and was fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Today, most corporate email still works that way, so that
email is still kept on users' computers (including corporate back-up
computers), not on Web servers or mail servers of third parties.
However, in contrast to 1986, with regard to the significant percentage
of email that is Web-based (including most consumer systems like
AOL, Hotmail, Gmail, and YahooMail), opened email is commonly
kept on third party servers. It is no longer sensible to accord it lower
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protection. Accordingly, legislators should update the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act to keep pace with these changes in
technology. We recommend that ECPA be amended to provide, as a
general rule, that the government not be able to obtain email content
information without a search warrant. The "180 day" distinction and
any distinction between opened and unopened email should be
removed in light of the fact that, with Web-based email programs,
open email is routinely kept on third party servers. 32 Similarly, the
distinction between "electronic communications service providers"
and "providers of remote computing service" should be eliminated -
most ISPs are both, and most email moves from one to the other
without the customer being aware that its legal status has changed.
The recent Councilman decision highlights a loophole in ECPA
that technically allows service providers to read and use (but not
disclose to others) the content of their subscribers' email. The
company whose practices were at issue in Councilman may have been
one of a kind. There is no evidence that other ISPs "read" customer
emails. While major ISPs do not engage in this type of behavior, a
narrowly-tailored reform would solidify customer confidence by
making it clear that ISPs may only access subscribers' emails as
required to provide the service protect the ISPs rights or property, or
in other limited circumstances.Y
3
In the 108th Congress (2003-04), legislation was introduced to
address some of these issues. The Email Privacy Act, sponsored in the
House by Representative Inslee (D-WA), would have ensured that law
enforcement officials have to obtain a wiretap order to gain real-time
access to Internet communications. The Inslee bill also would have
prevented ISPs from reading their customer's email except in cases
where it is necessary to provide service or with consent. With the
same intent, Representative Nadler (D-NY) introduced the Email
Privacy Protection Act. However, while both bills would have helped
to close the loophole highlighted by the Councilman decision, they did
not address other shortcomings of ECPA.
It might also be desirable to have legislation addressing the rights
and obligations of ISPs served with civil subpoenas. ECPA currently
32 More information on CDT's position on the Councilman case can be found in CDT Policy
Post 10.13, supra note 22.
33 One way to accomplish this would be to add to the end of 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2002),
the language in 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2002): "as may be necessarily incident to the
rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service." This is essentially identical to the language applicable to telephone companies. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2002).
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prohibits ISPs from disclosing the email of their subscribers without
some legal process, but it does not prohibit them from disclosing
identifying information or transactional records to private parties. This
should be addressed, by requiring at least a subpoena for disclosure of
subscriber identifying information and transactional data. In addition,
even though major ISPs, as a matter of policy, give notice to their
subscribers when information is subpoenaed, it should be codified. It
should also be made clear that notice must be given whether the
subpoena is for content or identifying of transactional information.
Legislation should place the responsibility for providing notice to the
individual whose information is sought on the party requesting the
subpoena unless that party does not know the subscriber's address, in
which case the ISP should afford notice. The law should provide
adequate time for the subscriber to contest the subpoena prior to the
information being released. It should also require that the party
requesting the subpoena provide the subscriber, or the ISP to pass on
to the subscriber, sufficient information to understand the charges and
the court in which they are being sued. The consensus standard found
in our study, immediate notification and a 14-day waitin4 period prior
to disclosure, is a starting point for such legislation. Likewise,
legislation should provide ISPs with the right to recover their
reasonable costs incurred in processing and replying to private and
government requests for customer information, whether resulting in a
positive or negative response.
Termination and deletion questions do not require legislation. As a
matter of industry practice, each ISP should clearly communicate to
customers what its termination and deletion policies are. These
policies should be available on their Web sites and in terms of service
and privacy policies. A good practice may be to give users control,
allowing them to set retention periods.
Much of the "next of kin" access problem stems from the fact that
identifying information is relatively easy to obtain, so ISPs feel
compelled to require people claiming to be relatives to provide high
levels of authentication in order to prove their relation to the account
holder and their need to access the account. One solution is for users
to leave a copy of their passwords with relatives, but this too raises
privacy and security issues. Clarification of policies regarding
deletion times may help the situation by making it easier for
consumers to realize how quickly they need to process next of kin
34 In California, such an obligation may already exist as a matter of state privacy law. In 2003,
legislation was introduced to codify the obligation, but did not pass. See The Internet
Communications Protection Act, A.B. 1143, supra note 26.
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requests. The thorny questions about privacy in the context of a
deceased subscriber are worthy of further study. Industry should
collaborate to develop appropriate and perhaps standardized practices
in this area. One solution is for individuals to address this issue in
their wills. Alternatively, ISPs could include in their terms of service
some kind of standard language, similar to the beneficiaries clause in
an insurance policy, stating that upon death of the subscriber stored
data would be provided to designated persons.
The move to greater storage is certain to bring with it an even
wider set of policy issues in the future, but addressing those in front of
us is becoming more urgent as the email providers increase their
capacity and services.

